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   ABSTRACT:   
Smartphones have become an intrinsic part of human’s life. The smartphone unifies diverse 
advanced characteristics. It enables users to store various data such as photos, health data, 
credential bank data, and personal information. The Android operating system is the prevalent 
mobile operating system and, in the meantime, the most targeted operating system by malware 
developers. Recently the unparalleled development of Android malware put pressure on researchers 
to propose effective methods to suppress the spread of the malware. In this paper, we propose a deep 
learning approach for Android malware detection. The proposed approach investigates five different 
feature sets and applies Autoencoder to identify malware. The experimental results show that the 
proposed approach can identify malware with high accuracy. 
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[1] INTRODUCTION  
The distribution of Android powered devices is estimated to be 1.2 billion in 2018. The 
forecast of global distributions in 2022 indicates that there will be 1.4 billion Android 
Devices [26]. Furthermore, the number of obtainable Android applications from the official 
Google play store is reached 3 million Android apps in 2017. The present rate of 
development is more than 1,300 apps a day [27]. The wide use of the Android operating 
system and proliferation of apps concurred with an unprecedented number of Android 
malware that reach 9,411 sophisticated malware daily for the Android in 2018. This means 
new malware emerging every 10 seconds [28].  
In an effort to defend Android users and their valuable information, many malware 
detection techniques have been proposed. Conventional methods such as signature based and 
heuristic based identification of antivirus can only distinguish already identified malware and 
consequently limit their detection effectiveness. Recently, deep learning has been introduced 
for Android malware detection. Deep learning is an explicit subfield of machine learning: a 
new method for learning representations from data that focus on learning consecutive layers 
of progressively significant representations (deep in deep learning refers to the concept of 
consecutive layers of    representations. How many layers are devoted to a model of the data 
is known as the depth of the model) [24].  
In light of this background, we propose a method for Android malware detection, 
employing static analysis and depend on five features extracted from APK files to build a 
deep learning classifier based on Autoencoders to classify Android apps into benign and 
malicious. In summary, our main contributions are twofold: first, developing a new Android 
malware detection system based on deep learning. Second, empirical evaluation of the 
proposed approach on a recent real-world dataset that reflects the changes in features 
according to the changes in Android specifications and contains new malware types. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the concerned work on 
Android malware detection and deep learning techniques. Section 3 describes the architecture 
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of the proposed methodology. The experimental results are illustrated in section 4 and the 
conclusion follows in section 5. 
[2] Related Studies 
    [2-1] Android Malware Detection Using Static Analysis 
The static analysis screen parts of the application without really executing them. W. Li et 
al. [15] designed a malware identification system based on a deep belief network. They 
suggested two types of features from Android apps for malware characterization, namely risky 
permissions and API function calls.  R. Nix et al. [16] they focused on program analysis that 
observes Android API calls made by an application. System API calls describe how an 
application communicates information with the Android OS. Such communication is crucial for 
an application to do its jobs, consequently providing essential data on an application's behavior. 
K. Xu et al. [17] developed the DeepRefiner malware identification system employs deep neural 
networks with diverse hidden layers. In a preprocessing step, DeepRefiner retrieves XML values 
from XML files in the first detection layer and grabs bytecode semantics from the disassembled 
classes.dex file in the second detection layer. DeepRefiner then connotes apps as vectors, which 
are used as inputs for deep neural networks. The hidden layers in neural systems accordingly 
build identification features from input vectors through non-linear translation. 
W. Wang et al. [18] seeking to improve the accuracy of large-scale Android malware 
detection by developing a hybrid system based on deep autoencoder (DAE) as pre-training 
procedure and different CNN structures for malware identification. Experimental results showed 
that CNN-P structure accomplished the best accuracy.  Yi Zhang et al. [19] They proposed an 
identification approach stand on Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and implemented a 
system DeepClassifyDroid. The structural design of DeepClassifyDroid is composed of three 
components: feature extraction component; embedding in vector space (embedding different 
feature sets into a joint vector space); deep learning model uses convolutional neural networks to 
carry out malware characterization.  Dali Zhu et al. [20] presented DeepFlow, a malware 
detection system that established on data streams within malware apps that may differ essentially 
from ones within benign apps, however, might be like different malignant apps to some degree. 
DeepFlow uses such differences and similarities to consequently determine new apps whether 
they are malignant or not by utilizing a deep learning model. 
[2-2] Android Malware Detection Using Dynamic Analysis 
    The dynamic analysis technique includes the execution of the application on either a 
virtual machine or a physical device. H. Liang et al. [21] developed natural language processing 
techniques for Android malware analysis on the premise that there is a resemblance between 
theme drawing and malware identification. They designed a model that deals with system call 
sequences as texts and considers the malware detection function as theme extraction. First, an 
embedding layer was utilized to represent the system calls to vector space. Then, the module, 
which is called vertical multiple convolutions, was employed to exploit possible high-level 
information from the exceeding presentation matrices of the long sequence. Finally, a multilayer 
perceptron with SoftMax layer was applied to complete the classification function. 
     [2-3] Android Malware Detection Using Hybrid Analysis 
     The hybrid analysis technique consolidates static analysis and dynamic analysis features. 
R. Vinayakumar et al. [22] proposed the use of Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) which is a 
special type of recurrent neural network used to study long-term transient dynamics with a series 
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of random lengths for Android malware identification based on static and dynamic features. The 
results showed a good performance accomplished by LSTM. H. Alshahrani et al. [23] developed 
DDefender a malware identification system includes two main parts: first, client side, a light app 
running on the user's phone to preform dynamic analysis and provide analysis report for the users. 
Second, server side, a system that preforms static analysis and identification procedure and sends 
the outcomes back to the client side. 
In this paper, we intend to use the Autoencoder in a different way from the way it has been 
used in literature. Usually, Autoencoder is used for features reduction or used in a pre-training 
phase, then another algorithm is applied for classification. Here we will use the Autoencoder to 
classify Android apps into benign or malicious ones. This requires training Autoencoder in semi -
supervised way. The trained model will be tested on the labeled and unlabeled dataset. 
 [3] The proposed Methodology 
[Figure-1] demonstrate the proposed methodology. The proposed methodology includes 
the following steps: 
 
Figure 1: The proposed methodology 
 
[3-1] Apps de-compilation 
The Mobile Security Framework (MobSF) [16] which, is a tool for Android malware 
analysis that can perform static analysis and dynamic analysis is used to decompile the apps 
and generation of smali files. 
[3-2] Features Extraction 
The MobSF is utilized for features extraction first, from Androidmanifest.xml, which 
include the Permissions and Intent filters. Then the APIs calls are drawn from Smali files 
created by MobSF. Afterword asset folder is checked for the presence of APK files. Finally, 
the legitimacy of the certificate is validated. 
[3-3] Features set 
• Permissions combination(featureset1-fs1): A permission is a limit restraining the entry 
to a portion of the code or data on a device. The limitation is imposed to safeguard 
essential information and code that could be misused to damage the user’s experience. 
Permissions are utilized to allow or limit an application access to restricted APIs and 
resources [3]. Permissions that are asked for by an application can imply its 
functionality to some extent. Nevertheless, permissions can serve both malicious apps 
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and benign ones. Thereby, it is necessary to join various permission requests 
concurrently for proper malware identification [4], [5]. 
• Intent Filters(featureset2-fs2): Intent is an intricate messaging system in the Android 
system, and is conceived as a security technique to block applications from obtaining 
passage to other applications instantly. Applications are required to have particular 
permissions to utilize Intents. This is a method for regulating what applications can do 
once they are set up in Android. Intent-filter – characterized in AndroidManifest.xml 
file – reports the kind of Intent the application is able of taking [6], [7]. 
• API Calls(featureset3-fs3): APIs utilized by an application chooses the genuine 
convenience and limit of the application. Static analysis of APIs handled in an 
application is pivotal to relate to what the application truly plans to do. Particular API 
calls enable access to system services or resources of the device and are frequently 
found in malicious applications. As these calls can be especially direct to malignant 
conduct [8]. The following API calls are analyzed: Telephony Manager. [9]; HTTP 
association and attachments [10]; DexcClassLoader [11]; Reflection; System Service; 
Runtime and System; cryptographic activities (crypto) [12]. 
• Invalid certificate(featureset4-fs4): To examine the legality of the certificate. An 
invalid certificate demonstrates that the application has tampered with (repackaged) 
[13]. 
• Presence of APK files in the asset folder(featureset5-fs5): masking data in the asset 
folder is regarded as an exemplary behavior of the malicious application. [14] 
       [3-4] Feature Vector 
All of the extracted features are converted into a feature vector. Each feature set is 
described as a Boolean expression with different dimensions and then produced a unified 
representation by mapping different sets into a joint vector space. For evaluation, the defined 
combination of defined feature set S: 
              
| Si |- dimension set Si is used to represent a feature set which is a vector of zeros with a ‘1’ in 
the position if apps have used a certain feature in the feature set. Consequently, we can convert 
any app X to a vector space ( ) :x   
   
| |: {0,1} , ( ) ( ( , ))sx x I x s s S →  →    
Where the indicator function ( , )I x s  is defined as:  
 
 
 
Thus, different features can be mapped to into unified joint vector. 
    [3-5] Deep learning Classifier 
Building upon the extracted features the Autoencoder study features to identify Android 
apps. The Autoencoder as illustrated in [Figure- 2] below comprises of an encoder and a 
decoder. The correspondence of the input layer to the hidden layer is known as encoding and 
the correspondence of the hidden layer to the output layer is known as decoding. The encoder 
receives the vector of input characteristics and translates them via sigmoid activation functions 
in the hidden layers into new features [1]. 
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 Figure 2: Autoencoder Structure 
 
An autoencoder is a feed forward neural network utilized to study representations of 
data. The principle is to prepare a network with at least one hidden layer to rebuild its inputs. 
The output values are established equal to input values, i.e. xˆ  = x for the purpose of studying 
the identity transformation h(x) ≈ x. The autoencoder accomplishes this by arranging input 
characteristic to hidden layer nodes utilizing an encoder function [1]:  
 h(x) = f (Wx + bh)   (1) 
where x is the input vector of characteristics, f stands for the sigmoid function, bh is the vector 
of hidden neuron biases, and W is the matrix of hidden weights. The data is restored utilizing a 
linear decoder:  
        g ( xˆ ) = λf (Wx + bh) + bg    (2) 
After studying the weights W, every hidden neuron depicts a specific feature of the input data. 
Therefore, the hidden layer h(x) can be regarded as a new feature depiction of the input data. 
The hidden depiction h(x) is then utilized to rebuild an estimate xˆ of the input utilizing the 
decoder function g ( xˆ )[1]. The frequently used function for the encoder and decoder is a 
nonlinear sigmoid function. Training is generally accomplished by decreasing the squared 
reconstruction error 
2 ˆ(  ( ) )xg x−  using the backpropagation by gradient descent algorithm. 
in practical terms, the restriction λ = 
TW  is usually determined to lower the number of 
parameters [1].  The fundamental idea is that by learning the hidden depiction h(x) that can 
rebuild the original input characteristics, the autoencoder obtains significant features of the 
input characteristics. 
     The training procedure for an autoencoder can be separated into two phases: the first 
phase is to learn features and the second phase is to adjust the network. In the first phase, feed-
forward propagation is first executed for each input to get the output value xˆ . Then the errors 
are utilized to quantify the deviation of xˆ  from the input value. In the end, the error will be 
backpropagated through the network to revise the weights. In the adjusting phase, with the 
network having appropriate features at each layer, the standard supervised learning method can 
be adopted to tweak the parameters at each layer [2]. 
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[3-6] Classification 
Classification is the procedure for studying the target function f that interprets each 
attribute set x to one of the predetermined class labels y . By applying the Autoencoder, the 
new unknown apps will be labeled as benign or malicious. 
[4] Result and Discussion 
[4-1] Dataset Setup 
For all experiments, we use a dataset of real Android apps and malware. The dataset 
contains 1200 apps in total, incorporating 600 benign apps and 600 malicious apps. The benign 
apps were downloaded from the official Google play store (https://play.google.com/store) and 
APKpure (https://apkpure.com) in September 2017. The benign apps belong to different 
categories such as magazines, utilities, games, etc.., and represent popular apps in their 
corresponding category (all the downloaded apps have at least 500,000 installations). All of the 
benign apps passed the scan of the latest versions of 3 Antivirus, ESET Internet Security 11.2, 
Symantec Endpoint 14, and Kaspersky Internet Security 18. The malicious apps obtained from 
Contagiodump(http://contagiominidump.blogspot.com), droidbench (https://github.com/secure-
software-engineering/DroidBench), Android malware (github.com/ashishb/android-malware), 
virusshare (https://virusshare.com), and virussign (www.virussign.com) represent different 
malware types such as Trojan horses, Backdoors, Information Stealers, Ransomware, 
Scareware, etc... The malware was picked from datasets collected between May 2013 and 
December 2017.  
[4-2] Experimental Setup 
The experiments are conducted using Autoencoder model utilizing Keras library. 
[Table- 1] below shows the structure of the Autoencoder. 
 Table 1: Autoencoder Parameters 
 
 
As shown in [Table-1] the Autoencoder uses 4 fully connected layers. The first two 
layers are used for the encoder, the last two layers go for the decoder. The sigmoid activation 
function is used in the first and fourth layers, while relu and tanh activation functions are used 
on the second and third layers respectively.  Autoencoder trained on malicious apps only. 
Keeping the benign apps on the test set will provide a means to evaluate the performance of the 
Autoencoder. 80% of the dataset is used for training, while 20% of the dataset is kept for 
testing. We chose accuracy and F1-Score to evaluate the experiments. 
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[4-3] Experimental Result 
Table 2: The Autoencoder detection result  
 
ACCURACY F1-SCORE 
96.81 95.4 
 
As shown in [Table-2] the ability of the Autoencoder to identify an app as benign or 
malicious is 96.81%. Further, the F1-score which indicate to what extent the Autoencoder model 
determinant is 95.4%. 
[Figure-3] illustrates the loss in the training and test datasets. [Figure- 4] illustrates the 
accuracy in training and test datasets. 
 
                  Figure 3: The loss in training and test datasets 
As demonstrated in [Figure-3] the reconstruction error in training and test data appears to 
converge well, and it is small enough. 
  
              Figure 4: Accuracy in training and test datasets 
As demonstrated in [Figure- 4] the accuracy in training and test data is high and on 
average, the Autoencoder model achieved 96.81% of accuracy. 
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For further evaluation of the model, we conducted several experiments using different 
dataset split as demonstrated in [Table- 3]. 
     Table 3:  Demonstrates Accuracy and F1-Score using a different split for training and test dataset 
 
As shown in Table 3 the detection performance changes with the Autoencoder of 
different dataset split percentage but remained high. 
[5] Conclusion 
The surge of Android malware that appears every 10 seconds as reported in [28] call for a 
new malware detection technique that can live up to the damage the malware can inflict on 
Android powered devices. In this paper, we propose a new, deep learning-based approach to 
Android malware detection resting on five different features: permissions combination; Intent 
filters; API calls; Invalid certificates; the presence of APK files in asset folder to construct an 
Autoencoder classification model that is capable of identifying malicious apps from benign ones. 
The performance of the proposed approach is evaluated on real-world dataset contain different 
benign apps categories and various malicious sample types. The result shows that the proposed 
approach can achieve high accuracy of 96.81%. 
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